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Introduction  
The rise of the People’s Republic of China to economic superpower status has affected the 
globalization process on many fronts, ranging from economics to politics, from 
telecommunications to the environment.  However, China’s economic ascent has had equally 
striking effects on global energy demand and supply.  China’s gross domestic product has grown 
at an average of 9 percent per year during the past decade.  This tremendous solid economic 
growth has caused an increase in the country’s oil consumption, reducing the global oil supply, 
and contributing to the spike in global oil prices in 2008, when a barrel of oil reached the price of 
$147.29 (Bradsher, 2009; Mouawad, 2009).  These important developments have led China to 
search for energy supplies all over the world and to negotiate, in some instances, with rogue 
regimes, such as the Sudanese and Iranian governments; the international community considers 
these governments rogue regimes due to the many human rights abuses sanctioned by them 
(Bradsher, 2009).   
China’s rise to superpower status requires that the country asserts a more proactive and 
responsible role in the international community than it has in the past.  As China expands its 
relationships with other countries across the world, it is uncertain whether it will take such a role.  
Its non-transparent deals with foreign governments and moderate approaches to developments at 
international institutions, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, can lead to suspect 
that the country will not become a more “responsible stakeholder” in the international 
community, even though long term trends suggest that it will do otherwise with time (Gill, 
2007).   
This report examines the growing energy needs and role as an international superpower of China, 
the world’s fastest-growing economy and the second largest oil consumer by:  1) Providing a 
timeline of the recent developments surrounding China’s energy needs and role as an 
international superpower; 2) Discussing contending perspectives and taking a position on 
whether China is a developed or developing country; 3) Examining China’s energy needs at the 
international level and its implications; 4) Examining China’s energy needs at the national level 
and the debate within China about what to do to achieve energy security; 5) Examining the 
political implications of China’s hunt for energy sources; 6) Examining the trends in China’s rise 
to superpower status and involvement in international organizations to predict its future role in 
the international community; and 7) Offering recommendations to the Chinese government to 
reduce its oil dependency, increase its use of alternative energy sources, maintain good 
relationships with its allies and trading partners, and become a more proactive, reliable and 
responsible stakeholder in the international community. 
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This short study argues that:  1) China, by most measures, is still a developing country, yet one 
making rapid progress to develop; 2) China lacks coordinated energy policies and a government 
institution to implement such policies; 3) China’s energy deals with rogue regimes and in the 
geographical sphere of influence of the United States may be perceived by the latter as a threat to 
its global hegemony; 4) China’s energy diplomacy lacks transparency; 5) China’s energy 
policymakers suffer from policy paralysis and prevent the creation and execution of a Chinese 
national energy strategic plan; 6) China’s alternative energy plans lack adequate funding.    
Timeline of Relevant Developments 
1993: China becomes a net importer of oil (Downs, 2004). 
1999: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a state-owned corporation, starts  
 producing oil in Sudan (Houser, & Levy, 2008).   
2001:  China joins the World Trade Organization (Castle, & Jolly, 2010).   
2003:  Violence erupts in the Darfur region of Sudan (Houser, & Levy, 2008). 
2003:  China imports from foreign markets in raw materials total $73 billion   
(Houser, & Levy, 2008).   
2007:  China imports from foreign markets in raw materials total $240 billion, a $167 billion    
 increase from 2003 (Houser, & Levy, 2008).   
2007: CNPC’s oil output from Sudan reaches 200,000 barrels per day in December.  This  
 accounts for 64 percent of all Sudanese oil exports and roughly 5 percent of Chinese oil  
 imports (Houser, & Levy, 2008; French, 2007).   
2007: Total Chinese overseas’ oil production totals 620,000 barrels a day  
(Houser, & Levy, 2008).   
2007: China becomes the 12th peacekeepers’ contributor to the United Nations missions (Gill, 
2007).   
2008: China’s oil consumption totals 8 million barrels a day (Bradsher, 2009).   
2008:   Price of oil reaches a record per barrel price of $147.29 (Mouawad, 2009).   
2008: China joins the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and invests $350 million in  
 it, increasing its presence and influence in Latin America (Kraul, 2008).   
2009:  China’s gross domestic product grows at 8.7 percent (Wassener, 2010).   
2009: U.S. firms invest $3.6 billion in China during the year (Roberts, 2010).   
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2009:  China National Petroleum Corporation starts drilling oil fields in southern Iraq    
  (Bradsher, 2009).   
2009: The Chinese government increases its Africa Development Fund by $2 billion   
(Baldauf, 2009).   
2009: China becomes the world’s largest automaker, as a result of the global economic crisis  
 and China’s sustained economic boom (Bradsher, 2009).   
2009:  China becomes the world’s main manufacturer of wind turbines, an important alternative  
 energy source (Bradsher, 2010). 
2010: The Venezuelan Government announces that China will provide the country with $20  
 billion in loans, as well as establish an investment fund worth more than $12 billion  
 (Romero, 2010).  
2010:  Several American trade associations send a letter to President Barack Obama “warning”  
 the federal government of the Chinese government’s efforts to protect their national  
 companies at the “expense” of foreign firms, especially American enterprises  
 (Roberts, 2010).   
2010: China invests $50 billion in the World Bank and the IMF, increasing its voting rights and  
 becoming the third country of influence in the World Bank--just behind the U.S. and  
 Japan.   
Is China a Developed or a Developing Country? Contending Perspectives   
Because of its large economy and even larger population, determining whether China is still a 
developing country or has reached the level of development required to consider it a country of 
the so called first world or developed is a challenge.  China may already be considered a 
developed country.  China’s economy ranks second in terms of GDP, only behind the United 
States, and the country houses 20 percent or 1/5 of the entire population of the world (Baige, 
2005; Roberts, 2010; Davis, 2009).  China is one of the world’s major export countries and has 
accumulated a trade surplus with the United States of $227 billion, mainly over the last decade 
(Roberts, 2010). In addition, China holds more than $1 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, 
including more than $700 billion in U.S. securities (Morrison, & Labonte, 2008).  China’s latest 
positive sign concerning development and growing influence is the country’s investment in the 
World Bank; China has already invested $50 billion this year (Ide, 2010).  As political scientist 
Martin Edwards of Seton Hall University states, when explaining China’s economic progress and 
development: “It is tough to think about China as a developing country [anymore]” (Ide, 2010).   
These very positive signs may indicate that China is, indeed, already a developed country.  
However, the reality is very different.  Despite China’s tremendous economic progress, the 
country faces significant challenges in terms of human development and rule of law that prevent 
it from becoming a truly developed country.  China may have the world’s second economy, but 
more than 100 million of its citizens live on less than one dollar a day, which underlines the 
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significant levels of poverty prevalent in this economic superpower (Summers, 2010).  Several 
authors (Davis, 2009; Summers, 2010; Chao, 2007) have stressed the inequality prevalent in 
China between the progress in the cities and misery and underdevelopment in rural areas of the 
country.  For instance, the illiteracy levels in some rural communities of China average 50% , 
while in the cities less than 10 percent do not know how to read or write (Chao, 2007).  In 
addition, China ranks 104th in the world’s Human Development Index—the United Nations 
index that evaluates the quality of development and human life around the world (Baige, 2005); 
therefore, based on this index China is considered a country of median development, yet still 
developing.  Another point of comparison useful in determine the level of development in China 
is per capita income, or the average amount of money each person earns each year.  Due to its 
large population—the world’s largest—China’s per capita income is very low, roughly $3,000.00 
a year, compared to the U.S. with $46,900.00 (CIA, 2010; Davis, 2009).  These figures highlight 
the long road that China has to travel before it gets to become a developed country.   
Perhaps the situation of China is best described by its Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, who has 
repeatedly stated: “China is a big country.  Any achievement, however large, when divided by 
1.3 billion people, is a very small achievement” (Davis, 2009).  This in no way suggests that 
China has not made progress in the past decades.  The group that has seen more positive changes 
is young adults, especially those belonging to the urban middle class (Davis, 2009).  China is 
home to many young entrepreneurs and, as Summers (2010) notes about Beijing, Shanghai, and 
other large Chinese cities, “home to more millionaires than there are in most European 
countries..[which may lead you] question the developing tag” (Summers, 2010).   
The rule of law is one important aspect in which China lags behind the developed world.  
China’s judicial system is highly corrupt and inefficient in solving legal disputes.  The Chinese 
government recently passed a law that affects foreign investors since it requires companies to 
have their copyrights and trademarks filed in China before they do so overseas; this measure will 
provide Chinese bureaucrats with access to these business secrets, and these could in turn pass it 
on to Chinese businesses (Roberts, 2010).  The corruption in China is so rampant that, as 
Goldman (2007) notes, “entrepreneurs are dependent on the [Communist] party for their 
economic livelihood.  They need the help of party officials to initiate and maintain their 
enterprises” (Goldman, 2007).  Furthermore, Chinese citizens who sue the government for 
irregularities often see their cases rejected by the courts or with no action taken on them.  An 
important case in point is that of several peasants from Shiqiao, China, who lost portions of their 
land because the Chinese government claimed eminent domain on them to build major public 
infrastructures, such as roads (Kahn, 2005).  To become a developed country, China has a long 
road ahead of itself in terms of social justice and credibility of its government.   
While China may meet the criteria of a developed country in economic terms, but the country’s 
standing in other important aspects of development, especially human development, indicate that 
it is far from becoming a developed country.  While the Chinese economy, by most measures 
including its total GDP, represents the third largest economy of the world, surpassing countries 
like France, the United Kingdom and Germany, it lags behind all of these countries in terms of 
citizens’ access to education and technologies, literacy level, income equality, and effectiveness 
and credibility of its system of justice.  Based on the aforementioned indicators, this report 
concludes that China is a developing country, but one making rapid progress towards becoming 
one.   
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China’s energy needs in the global context: China energy investments 
Within two decades, from 1973 to 1993, China went from being East Asia’s biggest exporter of 
oil to become the world’s second largest importer of oil—only behind the United States (Zweig, 
& Jianhai, 2005; Downs, 2004).  The era of Chinese energy independence ended in 1993 when 
the country, due to its economic growth and subsequent increased oil consumption, and its 
increased urbanization, started to import more oil products than it exported (Daojiong, 2006; 
Morrison, 2008).  This dramatic development would have repercussions that only a few scholars 
did predict: In its search for energy sources, China would become one of the world’s most 
influential economic powers.  
In order to meet the energy needs of the country, the Chinese government made the pursuit of 
international foreign sources of energy one of its top priorities (Daojiong, 2006; Downs, 2004; 
Morrison, 2008; Zweig, & Jianhai, 2005).  The Chinese government, through its state-owned oil 
companies, made its first purchase of rights for overseas oil explorations in 1993 when it bought 
the Talara Block in Peru for $25 million (Daojiong, 2006).  Ever since Chinese oil companies 
have made oil investments in several countries.  Chinese oil companies, especially the China 
National Corporation, PetroChina, and Sinopec, currently possess energy investments in 
Venezuela, Sudan, Iran, Iraq, Angola, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Australia, Ecuador, Brazil, 
Canada, Turkmenistan, and others (Daojiong, 2006; Zweig, & Jianhai, 2005;The Economist, 
2010).  These investments in foreign oil assets in several continents show that Chinese 
investments have achieved global presence; these actions can lead one to believe that the Chinese 
government can use these investments to expand its global influence.   
In addition to investing in foreign countries, the Chinese government has engaged in energy 
diplomacy with foreign governments.  The Chinese government has offered loans, investments in 
infrastructure, foreign aid, and debt forgiveness to foreign governments in exchange of access to 
energy sources and loyalty to China (Zweig, & Jianhai, 2005; The Economist, 2010; Daoijiong, 
2006).  For instance, in 2009 the Chinese government lent the government of Turkmenistan $4 
billion for the latter to develop one of its gas fields (The Economist, 2010).  In addition, to 
convince the Kazakhstan government to allow Chinese energy companies to acquire an 
important Kazakhstani oil company, the Chinese government lent its Kazakhstani counterpart 
$10 billion before the latter approved the deal (The Economist, 2010; Zweig, & Jianhai, 2005).   
Dr. Dosyn Satpayev, the director of Risk Assessment Group, a corporate consulting firm in 
Kazakhstan, describes China’s energy diplomacy approach as follows: “China does not only buy 
loyalty with documents, but with money given at a low percentage” (The Economist, 2010).  
China seems to not only desire to secure energy sources but also influence and loyalty through 
energy diplomacy.   
China’s energy needs in the national context 
The increasing energy needs of China have had a serious impact on the public administration of 
the country.  Contrary to common wisdom, the Chinese government has not managed China’s 
energy needs and its search for supplies internationally adequately.  China’s lack of a 
government institution to coordinate its efforts to achieve energy security and reduce 
international energy dependence represents the greatest challenge to China’s energy 
independence (Daojiong, 2006).  Several studies (Daojiong, 2006; Downs, 2004; Sinton, Stern, 
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Aden, & Levine, 2005) have stressed the need for coordinated action by the Chinese government 
to address local energy demand, search and acquisition of foreign energy supplies, and 
relationships with foreign governments concerning energy deals.  In 1993, China dissolved its 
ministry of energy and since then it lacks a ministry-level agency to coordinate its energy 
development policies; this affects China’s ability to develop a strategic plan to achieve its energy 
independence (Daojiong, 2006; Sinton, Stern, Aden, & Levine, 2005).   
Furthermore, the lack of a coordinating institution creates a problem of policy paralysis. (Sinton, 
et al. 2005) note that many interests groups are involved in setting Chinese energy policy, 
including the Chinese ministry for foreign affairs, the oil companies, and the top leadership of 
the Communist Party of China; this fragmentation of decision-making in the energy sector has 
led the Chinese government to postpone some important decisions, such as the creation of a 
Chinese strategic petroleum reserve (Downs, 2004; Sinton, et al., 2005).   If created, the strategic 
petroleum reserve could help China deal with any oil disruptions in international markets more 
effectively (Downs, 2004).  This policy paralysis has also prevented China from allocating more 
resources into alternative energy sources.  Sinton, et al. (2005) contend that if China wants to 
become energy independent, it must dramatically increase its investments in alternative energy 
sources, as well as develop energy efficiency mechanisms within the country; these initiatives, 
(Sinton, et al. 2005) argue, have not been pursued not only due to a lack of interest by the 
Chinese government, but most importantly due to policy disagreements among the key 
stakeholders and actors.  China needs a coordinating institution that can better address the 
challenges facing China in its efforts to pursue sustainable energy policies and become energy 
independent.   
Political implications of China’s increasing need for energy resources 
China’s hunt for energy sources has had political implications around the world, from Asia to 
Europe and from North America to Africa.  However, this paper covers the political implications 
of China’s search for energy sources on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and on its 
relationship with the United States.  Because the UNSC is the most powerful security committee 
in the world, of which China is a permanent member, and the United States is China’s main 
economic partner, the political implications of China’s search for energy sources on these two 
need examination.    
The United Nations Security Council  
In 1971, the People’s Republic of China became one of the five permanent members, with veto 
power, of the United Nations Security Council (Houser, & Levy, 2008).  China joined France, 
the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia (then the Soviet Union) as a permanent member 
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), after the United Nations transferred it from 
Taiwan (Houser, & Levy, 2008).  Because of China’s veto power in the UNSC, many human 
rights advocacy groups and media figures, such as Human Rights Watch, Pulitzer-winning 
author Samantha Power, and others, suggest that China would block any resolution in the 
Security Council punishing the Sudanese government for its human rights abuses (Kristoff, 
2006; Houser, & Levy, 2008).  In fact, in 2004, China blocked a resolution in the Security 
Council that would impose severe sanctions against Sudan, which signals the attitude of the 
Chinese government to use international instruments at its disposal, such as veto power at the 
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UNSC, when it deems necessary to protect their interests; in this case, energy sources (Spencer, 
2008).  By protecting rogue regimes through legitimate international diplomatic mechanisms, 
China isolates itself from the international ‘community at a time when it most needs China to 
take a more active role in this multipolar and globalized world.   
Tensions with the United States  
The United States remains China’s main commercial partner.  In 2007, the volume of trade 
between the two countries was $389 billion (Morrison, 2008).  China is the United States’ 2nd 
largest trading partner and the largest holder of U.S. Treasury bonds with $1 trillion invested in 
U.S. debt (Morrison, 2008).  These numbers demonstrate the Chinese and American economies’ 
interdependence; any disruption in either country would affect the other.  However, China’s 
search for energy sources in developing countries, especially with rogue regimes and foreign 
governments hostile to U.S. interests, has caused tensions between the two governments.   
Chinese investments and economic support to the governments of Iran, Venezuela, and Sudan 
have raised concern in Washington.  Morrison (2008), on a report for the Congressional 
Research Service, notes that several American policymakers worry that China’s energy needs 
could lead it to take actions contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests and cause tensions between 
the two countries.  President Hugo Chavez’s comments, when Chinese government officials and 
oil companies’ executives visited Venezuela in 2004, illustrate the risks that Chinese investments 
pose to U.S.-China relationships.  “We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 
years, but these have been 100 years of domination by the United States.  Now we are free, and 
place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland,” Chavez stated (Zweig, & Jianhai, 
2005, p. 33).  China’s incursion in the U.S. sphere of influence in search of energy supplies 
extends beyond America’s backyard.  In 2005, state-owned Chinese oil giant PetroChina signed 
an agreement with Enbridge, a Canadian oil company, to develop oil sands deposits in Canada, 
in addition to building a $2 billion pipeline to carry oil to the western coast of the country for 
easier shipment to China (Zweig & Jianhai, 2005).  Furthermore, the China National Petroleum 
Corporation started drilling oil fields in southern Iraq in 2009, while American troops and 
security companies provided security for the country, and Chinese investments received this 
indirect security at no cost (Bradsher, 2009).  Judging from President Chavez’ comment and 
Chinese actions in Canada, Iraq, and Venezuela many American policymakers may rightfully 
feel that the peaceful rise of China to superpower status may threaten not only American 
economic and political interests, but also its global influence.   
However, the most crucial test to Sino-American (China-U.S.) relations may come if China’s 
hunger for energy sources pushes it to increase its military power, especially its naval power; this 
would represent a direct threat to U.S. military global hegemony. As China becomes more 
dependent on foreign oil, it may find it useful to secure the sea lines it uses to transport oil from 
overseas, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Taiwan Strait (Zweig & Jianhai, 2005).  The 
United States Military has a strong presence in this region; it has a naval base in Diego Garcia, in 
the Indian Ocean and warships in the region (Zweig & Jianhai, 2005).  In 2005, then U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld demanded that the Chinese “explain why [they] are 
increasing [their] military investments when China faces no major threats; there is no evidence 
that China’s increased military spending poses a threat to the U.S. (Zweig & Jianhai, 2005, p. 
35).  China’s search for energy sources and its eventual military spending increases to protect its 
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energy supplies may threaten Sino-American relationships; China needs to carefully consider its 
future actions concerning its energy and oil shipments security to avoid damaging its relationship 
with the United States.   
Will China Take its Role in the International Community? 
Because nations’ future actions are unpredictable, predicting whether China will become a more 
responsible stakeholder and take its role as a rising superpower in the international community 
poses a difficult challenge.  However, this study surveys the most recent developments in 
China’s involvement in the international community to predict its future role in the international 
community.  China, given its economic ascent and increasing influence in world affairs, will be 
one of the countries with the most impact in the years ahead.  The eyes of the world are on China 
and what happens in China or by China will affect the world.   
The trend in China’s international relations suggests that China will become a more responsible 
and proactive member of the international community.  Evidence of this is China’s increasing 
involvement in the United Nations, especially on peacekeeping missions.  In 2007, China 
provided the United Nations with more than 1,800 troops, including observers and civilian police 
deployed in at least 12 nations around the world (Gill, 2007).  China has also made significant 
progress in the area of international security by becoming a signatory of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) (Gill, 2007).  In addition, the Chinese government has taken a 
proactive role in ensuring regional security in Asia by serving as an important mediator in the 
“Six Party Talks,” designed to increase security in the Korean Peninsula, and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (Gill, 2007).  In addition, due to its 
economic ascent, investments and involvement in the World Bank, China became the third most 
powerful country, in terms of voting rights, at the organization on April 26, 2010 (Ide, 2010; 
Chan, 2010).  With this move in voting rights made by the members of the World Bank, China 
surpassed Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other developed countries in terms of 
influence at the World Bank (Chan, 2010).  China’s involvement in different organizations 
suggests that it will indeed embrace its role as a superpower in a proactive manner.   
Of course, many concerns remain about China’s willingness to act responsibly and the nation’s 
future role as a superpower in the international community.  The U.S. and other developed 
countries have complained that China has manipulated its currency to make its exports cheaper 
(Gill, 2007; Morrison, 2008).  These countries have voiced their concerns stating that this is 
unfair competition because Chinese goods are cheaper in international markets, not because of 
their production methods, but rather because of the country’s currency manipulation and 
subsidized loans to local enterprises (Gill, 2007).  The latest event that has led many to question 
China’s willingness to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community is Google’s 
exit from the country, because of censorship issues.  At the beginning of the year, hackers 
attacked Google’s China operations, which added to the censorship of the Chinese government 
and unwillingness to act to catch these cyber-terrorists forced Google to close its operations in 
mainland China and operate its Internet search service from Hong Kong (Helft, & Barboza, 
2010).   As Emily Parker, a Senior Fellow with the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia 
Society, notes: “This has become a war of ideas between the American company [Google] 
moralizing about Internet censorship and the Chinese government having its own views on the 
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matter” (Helft, & Barboza, 2010).  Another point at issue that is affecting China’s standing as a 
responsible stakeholder is its aid to developing countries.  China provides developing countries 
with loans, investments, and direct aid (Walker, & Cook, 2010).  However, China’s aid, which 
does not require recipient countries to enact policies to become more responsible in the 
international community or to deliver to their citizens, encourages leaders in these countries to 
do the opposite of what they would do should this aid came from the World Bank or the IMF 
(Walker, & Cook, 2010).  The effect of China’s aid can be summed up as “assistance 
competition,” where developing countries receive aid from China with “no strings attached” and 
avoid reducing corruption and implementing policies to strengthen their countries’ institutions; 
China’s aid in this sense serves as a stumbling block to reforms rather than a motivator of 
positive reforms in these countries (Walker, & Cook, 2010).   
China’s actions offer mixed signals about its willingness to be a responsible partner in the 
international community.  While China has effectively made efforts to assert its role in the 
international community through its involvement in important organizations and cooperation on 
important issues such as security, it has failed to show enough willingness to assert its role 
through its national policies.  From undervaluing its currency and limiting the operations of 
foreign private companies, such as Google, to discouraging aid recipient countries, through its 
“no strings attached” economic aid, from enacting measures to strengthen the rule of law and 
governance mechanisms, China sends a negative signal to the world—it does something with its 
right hand and does something else with its left.  China needs a coordinated approach to 
international relations and to asserting itself in the world.  Through one voice and strategy, China 
could become a more responsible stakeholder and partner of developed countries in the search 
for solutions to climate change, energy issues, international security, global economic crisis, and 
global health crisis.  Any solution to global issues needs China, and China needs the world for 
any solution to the problems that affect it.   
Recommendations and Conclusion 
In order to achieve a sustainable path to energy independence and security, avoid affecting its 
relationships with important trading partners, become a truly developed country, and assert its 
role in the international community as a more responsible stakeholder, this report recommends 
that the Chinese government takes the following actions: 
• The Chinese government needs to invest more in education, especially in the rural areas 
of the country, where there is a high degree of illiteracy among citizens.  Chao (2007) has 
documented the inequality in access to education in Chinese rural communities, where as 
many as 50% of the population, on the average, is illiterate; this contrasts the 10% or less 
of the urban population which is illiterate (Chao, 2007).  Increased investments in 
schools, school grants for families, and computers for rural communities are necessary if 
China is to become a true developed country and superpower.   
• In order to continue attracting foreign investments and assert its role in the international 
community, the Chinese government needs to strengthen the rule of law in China by 
reforming its system of justice.  This report has noted the degree of corruption entrenched 
within the Chinese government.  One example highlighting this situation is the 
dependence of young entrepreneurs on government bureaucrats to advance their 
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businesses, as Goldman (2007) notes.  In addition, China’s system of justice is not 
responsive to its citizens’ needs.  For instance, Kahn (2005) notes that cases brought by 
Chinese citizens against the government are often not heard by the courts.  This 
negligence affects the rule of law in the country and violates the principle of the people 
petitioning the government for abuses committed by the latter.  One way to solve most of 
these issues would be not only to enact stricter laws concerning corruption, but also 
creating Inspector General offices at each or most Chinese public institutions and for the 
courts of the country.  Such a watchdog would serve as a check on corruption and 
provide the system with more accountability before its citizens.   
• China should create a coordinating energy agency or private/public partnership in charge 
of energy sources development, acquisitions of foreign energy sources, and improving 
energy efficiency in the country.  It could be named the Chinese Ministry for Energy 
Development, Efficiency and Security (CMEDES).  It could also foster partnerships with 
the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Chinese oil companies to deal more 
effectively with foreign governments.  This ministry would also increase Chinese 
investments in alternative energy sources, such as wind and solar power.  Progress has 
been made; for instance, China became the major manufacturer of wind turbines in 2009 
(Bradsher, 2010).  But alternative energy programs in China are underfunded and lack 
coordination (Bradsher, 2010; this situation could be improved under the proposed new 
government ministry.   
• To better deal with disruptions in international oil markets, the Chinese government and 
its oil companies should create a strategic petroleum or energy reserve, similar to the U.S. 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve.  Although it may cost the Chinese government billions of 
dollars, it would provide it with enough oil supply to keep the country moving for several 
months in the event of an international oil disruption.   
• The Chinese government should conduct high level meetings with its top trading 
partners, especially the United States and the members of the Security Council, to ensure 
that China’s hunt for energy resources does not affect its bilateral relations with these 
countries.   
• The Chinese government and its oil companies should increase the transparency of their 
energy deals in foreign countries, especially with those regimes with a record of human 
rights abuses, corruption, and whom the international community has sanctioned, such as 
Iran and Sudan.  They should do this by disclosing more information about these deals to 
the Chinese public and the international community.   
• While China’s aid to developing countries helps the latter to achieve their goals in terms 
of infrastructure and economic development, it also motivates them to postpone enacting 
and implementing reforms tackling corruption and helping strengthen the rule of law in 
these countries.  China’s aid should serve as a catalyst for positive changes in developing 
countries.   
• To ensure that China’s aid to developing countries does not conflict with the goals of 
global development institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
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Fund, the Chinese government and the top officials from these global institutions should 
set up a task force to examine these issues and come up with a coordinate strategy to 
offer aid to developing countries without conflicting the goals of either the Chinese 
government and the international community through these global development 
institutions.  Since China now ranks third in influence at the World Bank, it can use its 
clout to proactively assert its role as a responsible international stakeholder through such 
an initiative.   
China’s rise to economic superpower status will continue to have further implications for 
developed and developing countries alike.  As China’s economy and its energy interests continue 
to expand, the international community will closely watch any policies enacted or agreements 
made by the Chinese government with foreign governments.  This is China’s time to take a more 
active role in the international community, modify its approaches to meeting its energy needs, 
pursuing national policies such as justice systems reforms and anticorruption efforts more 
aggressively, and to act as a trustworthy stakeholder in the globalization process.   
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